



The property-liability insurance industry has experienced signifi-
cant turmoil during the past decade. Three related issues have received
enormous attention: increases in the frequency and severity of insurance
company insolvencies, high and increasing costs of automobile and
workers’ compensation coverage, and volatility in prices and in avail-
ability of commercial liability insurance coverage. These phenomena
have led to considerable debate over the efficacy of state insurance
regulation and the industry’s limited exemption from antitrust law.
Much of the policy debate concerns whether federal regulation of
insurance company solvency, expansion of state regulatory control over
insurance pricing, and narrowing or elimination of the exemption from
antitrust law are needed to deal adequately with these problems.
This paper addresses solvency regulation, rate regulation, and the
antitrust exemption for the property-liability insurance industry. In
each case, it first briefly reviews rationales for government action to
enhance economic efficiency. Then it will discuss regulation in practice
and whether proposed changes will enhance efficiency. The discussion
suggests three conclusions. First, the case for substantive federal inter-
vention in solvency regulation is not compelling, and federal interven-
tion could ultimately lead to an increase in the total cost of insolvency.
Second, state regulatory control of insurance pricing is inefficient.
Rather than expanding state regulation, efficiency would be better
served by deregulation of rates. Third, substantial change in the
industry’s antitrust exemption will not alleviate market problems. It
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could aggravate these problems, and it definitely would require a costly
period of adjustment.
Solvency Regulation
Insolvency risk for property-liability insurers arises from uncer-
tainty over both the magnitude of liabilities for claim payments and the
return on assets purchased with investor capital and premiums. The
value of insurer net worth also may fluctuate with changes in interest
rates. Finally, up-front payment of premiums and deferred payment of
claims create a significant risk of fraud and opportunistic behavior by
insurers.
Rationales for Solvency Regulation
In general, consumer difficulty in identifying weak insurers, possi-
bly weak incentives for solvency by some insurers, and high costs to
consumers of insurance company failure provide the major rationales
for government monitoring of solvency (including controls on insurer
behavior) and government guarantees of insurer obligations in the event
of insolvency.1 The case for government monitoring will be presented
first, assuming that government guarantees of insurer obligations do not
exist. The case for government guarantees and their relation to moni-
toring will then be discussed.
Government monitoring. The expected cost to insurers of providing
coverage declines as insolvency risk grows. The costs of evaluating
insurer insolvency risk are high for many consumers. If some consumers
cannot identify financially weak insurers at the time coverage is pur-
chased and some firms have weak incentives for solvency, uninformed
consumers will be attracted to insurers with low prices but high
insolvency risk. If all consumers are uninformed, financially weak
insurers might drive out all safe firms by charging lower prices. Since
consumers would soon learn that their insurance had little value,
demand for coverage would decline. Moreover, even if consumers could
costle~ssly and accurately evaluate solvency risk prior to purchase, they
would remain vulnerable to changes in insurer behavior that would
increase insolvency risk and appropriate policyholder wealth after the
time of sale.2
1 For further discussion of several of these issues see Munch and Smallwood (1981),
Finsinger and Pauly (1984), and Kunreuther, Kleindorfer, and Pauly (1983).
2 Such changes in behavior could be especially likely if an insurer’s financial condition
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In principle, government regulation can prevent or at least mitigate
these problems. Insurers with the incentive to be safe would be likely to
demand such regulation. In addition, a high incidence of insolvencies
without solvency regulation would be likely to stimulate substantial
consumer awareness 0~, insolvency risk and motivate some insurers to
undertake a variety of ~tivities to bond future claim payments, such as
restrictions on miniskirt capital and payments of funds to policy
owners. One likely type of restrictive covenant would be an agreement
for the insurer to submit to external monitoring. A rationale for
government monitoring is that it could be less costly than multiple
private arrangements.
Compulsory insurance requirements provide another motive for
government monitoring of insurer insolvency risk. For example, per-
sons with few assets to protect are likely to demand low-premium,
low-quality compulsory liability coverage. Since the market could be
expected to meet this demand, government regulation of solvency
might be needed to achieve the underlying policy objective of compul-
sory coverage.
Government guarantees. Since safety is costly, the efficient level of
insurer insolvency risk will not be zero. Absent government guarantees of
insurer obligations, insolvency would impose large costs on policyholders,
and they are likely to demand some protection against such costs. Risk-
averse policyholders will be willing to pay more than the expected cost of
unpaid claims to receive such protection. Private provision of such protec-
tion may be infeasible, given the possibly high correlation across insurers in
factors causing insolvency and the large amounts of capital needed to
insure the solvency of a private guarantor. However, it is possible that
public provision of mandatory coverage with the costs spread broadly
among insurance buyers could be efficient.
The possibility that failure of one insurer or rumors of trouble could
produce a "run" that would adversely affect otherwise solvent insurers
might provide a second motive for government guarantees. Without
government guarantees, it is possible that a run could occur if a failure
led to cash flow problems and ultimate liquidation of assets (tangible or
intangible) at prices below their true value. However, this motive would
appear to be much weaker for property-liability insurers than in a
fractional reserve banking system.
Unless all policyholders are unable to identify safe insurers, a major
drawback of government guarantees is that they are likely to increase
the incidence of insolvency. The reason for this is that accurate risk-
based premiums are likely to be infeasible in practice. Hence, govern-
ment guarantees will involve moral hazard: policyholders will have less
incentive to buy coverage from safe insurers and some insurers will have
less incentive to be safe.
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insurers, regulation must provide more discipline if an increase in the
frequency and severity of insolvencies is to be avoided. However,
increases in regulatory monitoring are unlikely to offset completely the
effects of reduced private incentives, for two reasons. First, the amount
of information and knowledge concerning insurer safety that is available
to regulators will not equal that diffused among and communicated
through large numbers of market participants and transactions. Second,
if government guarantees spread the cost of insurer insolvencies broadly
among insurers, policyholders, and taxpayers, they can reduce pressure
on government to commit resources and adopt internal controls that are
necessary for efficient monitoring. The extent to which this occurs
depends on the design of guarantees. Among other factors, if insolven-
cies impose costs on the owners of safe insurers, they will have greater
incentive to demand regulatory actions to control these costs. I return to
this subject below.
The general literature on moral hazard in insurance (for example,
Shavell 1979) suggests that it is likely to make partial insurance coverage
optimal. This implies that efficient guaranty fund protection will not
provide complete protection to policyholders and, intuitively, that the
optimal "co-payment" will be relatively greater for consumers who are
best able to monitor insolvency risk-~that is, consumers who can
monitor at relatively low cost. A complicating factor is that co-payments
will not induce greater monitoring if the costs are borne by other parties,
as would be true if the liability insurer of a judgment-proof tortfeasor
were to become insolvent.
Solvency Regulation in Practice
State governments have primary responsibility for insurance regu-
lation. Some coordination and uniformity among the states is achieved
through the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC),
which promulgates insurer financial reporting requirements and adopts
model legislative bills for consideration by individual states. Primary
responsibility for solvency regulation of an insurer traditionally has
rested with regulators in its state of domicile.
Overview of state solvency regulation. Solvency regulation has three
main facets: (1) controls over insurer operations, such as licensing
requirements, minimum net worth requirements, and limitations on
choice of investments; (2) monitoring of insurer financial condition,
including periodic on-site examinations; and (3) a system for paying a
portion of the claims of insolvent insurers. The most important moni-
toring system is administered by the NAIC. A team of examiners uses
statistical analysis of financial ratios and scrutiny of financial results to
prioritize insurers for further regulatory review or action by regulators in
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Most states enacted guaranty funds after the NAIC adopted a
model property-liability insurer guaranty fund bill in 1969.3 With the
exception of New York, which has a pre-funded plan, each state’s
guaranty fund assesses surviving insurers (in proportion to their pre-
mium volume in the state) for amounts needed to pay covered claims of
its citizens (Figure 1). Most states limit coverage to $300,000 or less per
claim except for workers’ compensation insurance claims, which usually
are fully covered. The maximum assessment on insurers in any one year
generally is limited to either I or 2 percent of state premium volume. If
the limit is reached, additional assessments are made in subsequent
years. 4
Causes of recent insolvencies. During the period 1984-89, the number
of property-liability insurer insolvencies was much larger than historical
norms, but the annual insolvency rate was always less than I percent of
all insurers. Net assessments by guaranty funds increased dramatically
during this period (Figure 1) but they still represented less than one-half
of 1 percent of nationwide premiums in each year.s Many insurers that
failed in the 1980s wrote relatively greater amounts of commercial
insurance, compared to earlier periods when insolvent insurers more
often had specialized in auto coverage.
The increase in property-liability insurer insolvencies has led to
substantial controversy over the underlying causes and the efficacy of
state solvency regulation. Much of this controversy revolves around a
report issued by a U.S. House of Representatives subcommittee chaired
by Rep. John Dingell (D., Mich.), following an 18-month investigation.
The Dingell report blames insolvencies on insurer fraud and misman-
agement coupled with ineffectual regulation and raises the specter of
another savings and loan type disaster unless something is done.6
The Dingell report reiterates many criticisms of state solvency
regulation that have been discussed for the past 20 years. Specific
criticisms include insufficient resources devoted to regulation, use of
unreliable information, lack of coordination among regulators in differ-
ent states, infrequent and poorly prioritized on-site financial examina-
tions, and the absence in many states of requirements for independent
3 This followed the introduction of a bill in the U.S. Senate that would have created
a federal guaranty system. At that time only a few states had guaranty systems.
4 Guaranty fund laws in a majority of states include a provision that permits insurers
to raise subsequent premiums to cover the costs of assessments. However, in a compet-
itive environment, premium rates will only reflect the expected cost of assessments from
new and renewal sales rather than the cost of assessments related to coverage sold in prior
years. Other states require premium surcharges for assessments or allow insurers to offset
assessments against state premium taxes over a period of years.
s Premiums written for the industry totaled $208 billion in 1989.
6 For further discussion and critique of this report, see Harrington (1991). Also see
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CPA audits of insurer financial statements, for certification of loss
reserves by a,n actuary, or both.
The report focuses on four property-liability insurer insolvencies,
three of which (Mission Insurance Company and affiliates, Integrity
Insurance Company, and Transit Casualty Insurance Company) are
large compared to historical norms. As of year-end 1989, net guaranty
fund assessments for these three insolvencies totaled almost $900
million. The National Conference of Insurance Guaranty Funds (NCIGF)
projected that net assessments ultimately would total $1.3 billion, but
the magnitude of the ultimate deficit and required guaranty fund
assessments is subject to significant uncertainty.7
The Dingell report and other anecdotal analyses generally suggest,
based on hindsight, that these insurers undertook rapid growth in new
and risky product lines and charged substantially inadequate prices and
established woefully deficient loss reserves (reported liabilities for claim
costs). Inadequate prices and loss reserves are frequently emphasized in
postmortems of insurers. However, as is discussed further below, it is
7 According to the Dingell report, the receivers for these insolvencies estimated a total
deficit of $5 billion. Transit Casualty accounted for over one-half of this amount, but the
report suggested that the estimate for Transit Casualty could contain substantial error. As
of year-end 1989, the NCIGF projected net assessments of approximately $300 million for
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usually difficult to determine the extent to which these phenomena
reflect unfavorable realizations in losses as opposed to deliberate under-
pricing and under-reserving. Mission, Integrity, and Transit Casualty
also made extensive use of managing general agents authorized to make
risk selection and pricing decisions and to arrange for reinsurance.
Much of the insurance and reinsurance sold by these insurers was
reinsured with hundreds of different U.S. and foreign reinsurers. Some
of these reinsurers became insolvent and did not pay amounts owed
Mission, Integrity, and Transit Casualty. Many others are denying
payment, alleging fraudulent concealment of information by these
companies. These disputes are now being litigated.
As has been the case for some synopses of the savings and loan
mess, allegations that property-liability insurer insolvencies are due
mainly to incompetence and moral turpitude are exaggerated and
incomplete. At least two other causes need to be considered. First,
unexpected growth in liability claim costs for policies sold during the
early 1980s undoubtedly contributed to the increase in the number and
magnitude of property-liability insurer insolvencies, which began in
1984 (Figure 2).~ This increase in insolvencies followed sharply deterio-
rating industry financial results for commercial liability insurance cov-
erage and coincided with the onset of the highly publicized liability
insurance crisis.
Mission, Integrity, and Transit Casualty had been in business for
many years prior to insolvency, had received the highest financial rating
from the major insurance company rating agency (the A.M. Best
Company) almost until the time that regulatory action was taken, and
had been audited by leading CPA firms. As the Dingell report empha-
sizes, these insurers rapidly expanded sales of liability coverage prior to
insolvency. In retrospect, much of this coverage was very risky; for
example, toxic waste liability, products liability for pharmaceutical
companies, excess limits coverage, and reinsurance. Based on hind-
sight, the Dingell report concludes that these companies engaged in
massive and deliberate understatement of loss reserves. However, a
significant amount of the reserve inadequacy for these and other
insurers that failed since 1984 is likely to have been caused by unpre-
dictable increases in both the frequency and severity of claims, even if
financial problems associated with such increases did cause some in-
8 General liability insurance includes coverage for products liability, environmental
liability, and the like. While some of the growth illustrated in Figure 2 could reflect
deliberate understatement of loss reserves in the early 1980s, the data nonetheless suggest
substantial unexpected growth in claim costs. The data do not include the experience of
insurers that later became insolvent. Such companies may have been most likely to
deliberately understate loss reserves in the early 1980s.246 Scott E. Harrington
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surers to pursue high-risk strategies in the face of imminent insolven-
cy-that is, to "go for broke" or "gamble for resurrection."
Second, although little is known about this issue, interest rate risk
also might have played a significant role in the problems of some
insurers, as was the case for many savings and loans. Property-liability
insurers invest mainly in medium- and long-term government and
high-grade corporate bonds. Since changes in interest rates generally
have a greater impact on the value of these investments than on the
value of insurer liabilities, the market value of property-liability insurer
net worth is negatively related to interest rates. It is possible that
increases in interest rates in the early 1980s, in conjunction with
unexpected increases in claim costs, produced severe financial problems
or actual insolvency for some insurers. These problems may have led
some of these insurers to go for broke.
The property-liability insurance market also appears to be charac-
terized by cyclical fluctuations in prices. While the causes of such
fluctuations are not fully understood, cyclical reductions in commercial
liability insurance prices during the early 1980s could have contributed
to the financial problems and subsequent insolvency of some insurers
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The role of guaranty funds. It would be very difficult or impossible to
sort out the effects of guaranty funds from other factors that cause
insolvency. Based on theory, it is highly probable that guaranty funds
contributed to the increased frequency and severity of insolvencies in
recent years, as well as to the greater prevalence of insolvent insurers
that wrote significant amounts of commercial insurance as opposed to
personal auto coverage. As noted earlier, guaranty fund protection can
encourage entry and growth of weak insurers with low premiums, and
it can facilitate go for broke behavior by insurers that have been
wounded by exogenous influences.9
Without guaranty fund protection, many insurance buyers would
have much less incentive to choose an insurer with the lowest premium,
regardless of its safety. Although many insurance buyers might be
ill-prepared to assess insurer financial strength, others (such as large
commercial buyers, or agents and brokers) are better able to do so.
Moreover, a strong preference for safety would motivate insurers to
make their promises to pay claims more credible to all buyers. This could
be achieved by holding more capital, by obtaining high ratings from
private financial rating services, and the like. Agents and brokers would
be more motivated to identify and deal with safe insurers in order to
avoid loss of future income due to policyholder departures in the event
that an insurer failed. Other parties, such as providers of mortgages and
auto loans, also would be expected to pay more attention to insurer
safety.
Contrary to complaints that guaranty fund protection may be
inadequate, a significant advantage of property-liability insurance guar-
anty funds is that coverage is limited.1° Expansion in the scope of
guaranty fund protection should be avoided. Instead, the scope of
protection probably can be reduced to achieve a better balance between
providing incentives for safety and protecting consumers from losses in
the event of insolvency. One approach is to reduce or even eliminate
guaranty fund protection for commercial insurance. This would increase
incentives for commercial buyers to deal with safe insurers and discour-
age them from buying coverage that they know is underpriced. Variants
of this approach have been endorsed by a large insurer trade group and
by the NAIC, and about 10 states have adopted limitations related to net
worth of commercial insurance buyers. A majority of state guaranty
9 Insurers with substantial intangible assets (such as those that arise from investments
in sales forces) that could be lost in the event of insolvency have considerable incentive to
operate safely regardless of the scope of guaranty fund protection. However, guaranty
fund protection gives buyers less incentive to purchase coverage from such insurers unless
their intangible assets are associated with the provision of desired services.
~0 Life-health guaranty fund coverage is even less comprehensive and is arguably
inadequate in some states.248 Scott E. Harrington
funds contain small deductibles for covered claims. Consideration also
might be given to incorporating a coinsurance provision that would
require buyers (commercial only or both commercial and personal) with
guaranty fund protection to bear a percentage (for example, 10 percent)
of their loss above any deductible in the event of insolvency, unless the
loss falls on some party other than the buyer.
Changes of this type can be made only if political pressure for
expansion of guaranty fund protection is overcome. The benefits of
guaranty fund protection are obvious and highly visible to the public;
the costs are spread broadly and are largely invisible. The popular media
seem to emphasize incomplete coverage under existing guaranty funds
rather than promote informed discussion of the advantages of further
restrictions.
The adoption of risk-based capital requirements for insurers or
advance, risk-based premiums for insurance guaranty funds also might
mitigate the adverse effects of guaranty fund protection on incentives for
safety. An NAIC task force is studying the former possibility. These
proposals have theoretical appeal, but their successful application is
likely to be hindered by inability to measure insurer risk accurately,
especially the magnitude of insurer liabilities. Moreover, regulatory
choice of capital standards or risk-based premium rates also would be
subject to substantial political pressure.
Any state guaranty fund system with advance premiums (as op-
posed to current post-insolvency assessment schemes) also would create
a risk that accumulated funds would be appropriated by state legisla-
tures for non-insurance purposes.11 Perhaps more important, post-
insolvency assessment in many states may provide financially strong
insurers (and their trade organizations) with more incentive to exert
pressure for effective solvency surveillance and efficient liquidation of
insolvent insurers than would be the case with advance premiums. The
reason for this is that unexpected increases in the costs of assessments
are likely to be borne by owners, as opposed to being fully shifted to
customers or taxpayers.12
Is Federal Regulation Desirable?
The increase in property-liability insurer insolvencies has led to
valid concern about the ability of regulation to detect and deal with
aggressive pricing and deliberate understatement of loss reserves, as
11 Experience under New York’s advance premium system provides some support for
this concern.
12 The desire to avoid loss of premium tax revenue in states that allow offset of
guaranty fund assessments against premium taxes also might produce pressure for
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well as with the extent to which reinsurance can be used to finance
excessive growth. However, based on evaluation of industry net worth
relative to liabilities and, perhaps, recent actions by the NAIC (described
later in this section), industry analysts generally believe that the finan-
cial condition of the property-liability insurance industry is basically
sound (Stevenson 1990; McCauley and Siemek 1990). Under the current
regulatory system and reasonable economic scenarios, it is implausible
that insolvency problems in insurance will even begin to rival those of
the savings and loan industry.
Nonetheless, it is highly probable that legislation will soon be
introduced that will provide for some federal role in insurance regula-
tion. While few details are available, it is possible that such legislation
will require minimum federal standards for state solvency regulation
and provide for direct federal regulation of reinsurers and surplus lines
insurers. 13 Other frequently discussed proposals for federal intervention
in solvency regulation, some of which have a long history, include an
option for federal regulation of companies that operate in many states,
and a federal insurance guaranty program.
The NAIC has taken a number of steps during the past several years
designed to improve solvency regulation (NAIC 1990). The extent to
which pressure generated by the Dingell investigation influenced some
of these changes is not clear. It is likely to have had some effect. Model
bills have been enacted or amended to require increased disclosure and
oversight of the activities of managing general agents and reinsurance
brokers and managers, and to significantly strengthen conditions that
reinsurers must meet before insurers can reduce their reported liabilities
to reflect reinsurance purchases. The amount of financial statement
disclosure for reinsurance transactions and loss reserves was signifi-
cantly expanded. The NAIC also adopted minimum standards for state
solvency regulation and a mechanism for certifying state compliance.
The establishment of minimum standards by the NAIC weakens the
case for federal standards. At least 15 states have requested certification;
many others are considering legislation needed to achieve compliance. If
some states fail to take action, their insurers will be likely to receive
greater scrutiny in other states where they do business (or in states
where they may be seeking a license). The attendant erosion in tradi-
tional deference to domiciliary regulators will create pressure for certi-
fication. Financially strong insurers also can be expected to pressure for
certification of their home states.
Recent insolvency experience and debate should lead to improved
monitoring by state regulators. It is clear that regulators need to pay
13 Surplus lines insurers sell coverage in a state without being licensed and subject to
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close attention to insurers with rapid growth and extensive use of
reinsurance in product lines that are difficult to price. This is especially
important if most of their policyholders are largely protected by guar-
anty funds, if their owners or principals have little to lose from
insolvency, or both. More attention also should be devoted to measur-
ing interest rate risk and to estimating and monitoring the market value
of net worth.
In principle, increased centralization of solvency regulation has its
advantages (for example, reduction in possibly inefficient duplication of
effort, better coordination of liquidations of multistate insurers, and so
on). However, it is not clear that politically induced inefficiencies would
be smaller with federal regulation. In fact, they could be greater. Given
the history of federal guarantees for depository institutions, the risk that
federal intervention in insurance solvency regulation will ultimately lead
to an inefficient expansion in the scope of guaranty fund protection is
not trivial. Spreading the cost of insolvencies even more broadly
through a federal guaranty system, which probably would be "pre-
funded" (and most assuredly would be backed by taxpayers), is the one
thing that should be avoided if the objective of policy is to minimize the
total cost of insurer insolvencies.
Moreover, while one might hope that the Congress would learn
from past mistakes, congressional inaction in dealing with mounting
insolvency costs for savings and loans is relevant to the debate over
insurance regulation. The deliberate congressional policy of "forbear-
ance" for insolvent thrifts, which multiplied the total cost of insolvency
by allowing go for broke behavior, is (or at least should be) sobering in
this regard. It has been argued persuasively that the policy of forbear-
ance was not an aberration; it was an ordinary and routine response to
constituent pressure (Romer and Weingast 1990). State regulators also
may face considerable pressure to delay liquidation of insolvent domes-
tic insurers, but regulators in other states will face less pressure to do
nothing while losses mount, and deference to domiciliary regulators is
not without limits. Moreover, any shortcomings of state regulation that
allowed the costs of recent property-liability insurer insolvencies to
increase seem trivial compared to the federal policy of deliberate
forbearance for insolvent savings and loans. Since the incentives facing
the Congress have not obviously changed, it is not at all clear that a
fiasco of this sort cannot happen in some other area.
Rate Regulation
Government regulation can affect the average overall rate level for
an insurer. For a given average rate level, it also can affect the level of
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restricting rate classification). If regulation suppresses rates below
market levels, whether overall or selectively, supply shortages can be
prevented, at least in the short run, by mandating service to all
customers through involuntary market mechanisms such as reinsurance
pools, joint underwriting associations, and assigned risk plans.
Rationales for Rate Regulation
Little or no justification exists for regulation of property-liability
insurance rates to enhance efficiency. The competitive structure of most
property-liability insurance markets, most notably the absence of sub-
stantive entry barriers, is inconsistent with supra-cost pricing in long-
run equilibrium. The industry’s limited antitrust exemption does not
alter this conclusion, as will be discussed below. Entry barriers for the
sale and underwriting of insurance by other institutions, such as banks,
might possibly prevent the introduction of alternative technologies, but
they will not produce supra-cost prices. Hence, regulatory limits on
maximum rate levels are not justified (Joskow 1973; Klein 1989; and
Cummins and Tennyson 1991; also see Harrington 1990).
The use of regulation to establish minimum rates has been sug-
gested as a means to reduce insolvency risk for some insurers and
perhaps to dampen any cyclical fluctuations in prices.14 Even if this
approach were politically feasible, it is not at all clear that it would be
preferable to regulatory monitoring of pricing and risk-taking, especially
in view of the anti-competitive potential of minimum rate regulation.
Adverse selection with asymmetric information could provide some
rationale for government establishment of residual markets and regula-
tion of residual market rates but evidence suggests that these markets
are very small, absent substantive regulatory suppression of voluntary
or residual market prices. Theoretical work on insurance pricing also
raises the possibility that insurers may engage in some inefficient risk
classification (Crocker and Snow 1986), but again this is not likely to
justify significant intervention in insurer pricing and risk selection
decisions. Finally, theory suggests the possibility of efficiency gains
from subsidizing liability insurance rates for some persons or entities
that might otherwise engage in risky activity without liability coverage
(Keeton and Kwerel 1984). Even if this is true in principle, regulators do
not have the knowledge of individual consumer preferences that is
necessary for efficient implementation (that is, for target efficiency).
14 Several states passed "flex-rating" laws following the liability insurance crisis of the
mid 1980s. The alleged purpose of these laws, which require approval of percentage rate
changes in excess of specified benchmarks, was to reduce price-cutting in so-called "soft"
markets that was believed to affect subsequent price increases and availability problems in
"hard" markets.252 Scott E. Harrington
Rate Regulation in Practice
Rate regulation across states is very diverse, both in terms of
statutory authority for rate regulation and implementation by state
insurance commissions. In personal auto insurance, for example, over
20 states have "competitive rating laws" intended to allow market
competition to determine rates. The remaining states require some form
of prior approval by regulators before rates are changed. Rate regulation
in some of these states is probably pro forma. In contrast, for many years
a relatively small number of states, including Massachusetts, New
Jersey, and South Carolina, have employed comprehensive rate regula-
tion with varying degrees of overall rate suppression and restrictions on
rate classification. The results of such policies have included large
involuntary markets and exits by many insurers.~5
The trend in both auto insurance and workers’ compensation
insurance in the past several years has been toward greater regulatory
intervention to limit price increases. While workers’ compensation was
exempted, this trend is exemplified by the passage of Proposition 103 in
California, with its populist proposal for an across-the-board rate
rollback for most property-liability lines, its limits on rate classification,
and its institution of prior approval rate regulation. The greater politi-
cization of rate regulation in auto and workers’ compensation insurance
coincides with increases in the underlying costs of providing coverage
and thus in premium rates that would be charged in the absence of
regulation.
Attempts to make coverage more affordable through rate regulation
cannot be reconciled with economic efficiency. Proponents of public-
utility-style rate of return regulation (including limits on allowable
operating expenses) and restrictions on rate classification argue that
insurance rates are too high because of inadequate competition that
produces inefficiency and excessive profits (Consumer Federation of
America et al. 1989). They also argue that rate classification is arbitrary
and unfair (or that insurers somehow fail to do it correctly). While they
argue for repeal of the industry’s antitrust exemption in order to
promote competition, their regulatory agenda is completely at odds with
this goal. These claims cannot be reconciled with the industry’s com-
petitive structure, especially ease of entry. Again, the antitrust exemp-
tion does not alter this conclusion. If it did, the efficient solution would
be to modify the exemption, not to expand rate regulation.
While measurement of insurer profits and rates of return is prob-
is For example, 15 insurer groups left the South Carolina automobile insurance market
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lematic~ accounting data do not suggest excessive returns.16 Claims of
widespread inefficiency usually point to "large" ratios of operating
expenses to premiums. The costs of settling and paying claims (for
example, attorneys’ fees) are lumped together with commissions to
agents, risk selection and policy issue costs, and state premium taxes.
The level of claim costs is usually not mentioned, unless it is to castigate
insurers for not doing enough to reduce accident rates.
The argument that insurance markets exhibit widespread ineffi-
ciency implies that insurers are willing to leave large amounts of money
on the table. Instead, insurers have substantial incentive (the lure of
higher profits) to minimize costs, including both the sum of claim
payments and claim settlement expenses and the cost of product
distribution necessary to provide a given level of service. The argument
that the insurance industry is highly inefficient also presumes an
absence of competition. If a large part of the market could be served at
lower cost, why does some company not do so, given the immense
profit potential? Why do consumers upset by high premiums not flock
to insurers with lower expenses, if by doing so they could pay less
without any reduction in service? If rate regulation somehow distorts
incentives for efficiency, the efficient policy is to abandon rate regula-
tion, not to control expenses.
It is possible that some inefficient insurers could survive if consum-
ers find it difficult to identify low-cost insurers. Whether this is an
important problem in insurance markets has been disputed by academic
researchers (for example, Dahlby and West 1986). My own view is that
it is implausible that significantly greater premiums for large numbers of
buyers could be due to costly consumer search. Moreover, to the extent
that comparison shopping is difficult enough to justify action by the
government, the preferred mode of regulation is increased information
disclosure rather than rate regulation or restrictions on insurer expense
levels.
Consequences of rate suppression. The use of rate regulation to sup-
press rates has several adverse consequences that are suggested by basic
economic theory and, in some instances, empirical evidence (see, for
example, Grabowski, Viscusi, and Evans 1989; Rottenberg 1989). Rate
suppression will make less coverage available voluntarily. This produces
larger involuntary markets, such as joint underwriting associations and
1~ Available evidence on profitability in the property-liability insurance industry,
although subject to considerable debate, does not indicate excessive profits or rates of
return on net worth. While details differ, most analyses suggest that the rate of return on
net worth for the overall industry during recent years has averaged around 10 percent.
(See, for example, Insurance Services Office 1989; also see Cummins and Tennyson 1991.)
Measurement of insurer profitability is problematic for several reasons. See Harrington
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reinsurance pools. It also provides an incentive for insurers to reduce
product quality, perhaps in some cases by increasing insolvency risk. As
noted, continued restrictions on rates also have influenced exit by some
insurers.
Rate suppression and the mandated markets that tend to follow also
are likely to produce significant cross-subsidies. Rates tend to increase
for consumers who, on average, have low expected claim costs so that
high-risk buyers can pay below-market rates. Such policies reduce the
incentive for high-~isk buyers to control claim costs. Moreover, by
requiring insurers to pool claim costs among companies, reinsurance
facilities and joint underwriting associations are likely to reduce the
incentive for individual insurers to settle claims efficiently. It is also
possible that rate suppression reduces political pressure on state legis-
latures to adopt potentially desirable forms of claim cost control.
Restrictive rate regulation also can produce long and costly rate
hearings, in which insurance industry employees, state government
employees, consultants, advocates, other experts, and counsel for all
parties engage in unresolvable arguments concerning issues such as the
magnitude of future loss costs, the appropriate size of premium loadings
for insurer expenses and income taxes, and the rate of return needed by
insurers.
The application of public-utility-style rate of return regulation in the
property-liability insurance market is subject to particularly severe
shortcomings. The rate base chosen, which is likely to be accounting net
worth, may diverge significantly from economic net worth for many
companies, especially those with substantial intangible assets that
reflect the value of investments in distribution systems, product devel-
opment, claims facilities, and human capital. The amount of net worth
necessary to write a given level of insurance also must be specified. Any
fixed norm will be likely to distort supply in a number of ways. Low
norms will produce lower premiums but will give insurers incentive
either to exit or to reduce net worth and thus increase insolvency risk. It
also is necessary to allocate an insurer’s net worth by line and by state
for insurers that write multiple lines in multiple states. This allocation
has no compelling theoretical basis and the use of norms fixed by line
and by state is likely to cause undesirable fluctuations in the supply of
coverage. For example, a norm that allocates less (more) net worth than
an insurer feels is necessary to write a given level of coverage will cause
the insurer to contract (expand) supply or perhaps reduce (increase)
quality for that line of business.
Rate of return regulation for utilities commonly is based largely on
historical costs of providing services, along with specified procedures
for allowing for future increases in labor and fuel costs. Insurance
rate-making is not amenable to these simple procedures. The magnitude
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and the magnitude of costs becomes known much more slowly than for
utilities, especially for long-tailed liability lines. Moreover, considerable
heterogeneity in expected claim costs often exists among insurers that
write business in a given line or state. Attempts to use fixed formulas
and procedures to forecast losses under rate regulation again would be
likely to lead to serious distortions in supply, and they would have an
unequal effect across companies. Attempts by regulators to conduct
detailed analyses of the anticipated loss experience for each company
and line of business would lead to costly duplication of insurer activities.
They also would be likely to produce unresolvable disputes about
various factors that could affect future costs.
Price regulation also tends to reduce the incentive for companies to
adopt efficient innovations over time. If, for example, an insurer were
limited to a specified rate of return on net worth, the potential for
increased profits from the development of new procedures that reduced
operating expenses would largely disappear. As a result, the insurer
would be less likely to fund a given investment, and expenditures for
research on cost-saving or service-enhancing innovations would be
expected to decline.
All of these problems with rate of return regulation might be
necessary evils for natural monopolies. Rate of return regulation for
property-liability insurers can only be justified if the policy objective is
to have prices determined by political pressure rather than competition.
The Antitrust Exemption
The McCarran-Ferguson Act, which was enacted by the Congress in
1945, endorses the primacy of state regulation of insurance and provides
the industry with an exemption from federal antitrust law for activities
that are subject to state oversight and that do not involve boycott,
coercion, and intimidation. A number of cooperative activities have
developed under this exemption, most importantly the development of
policy forms and estimation and dissemination of "prospective loss
costs" by industry advisory organizations. Advisory organizations have
also promulgated "advisory rates" that included expense and profit
loadings, but this is being phased out.17 Some form of cooperative
development of policy forms and sharing of data on paid claims would
be likely to survive antitrust scrutiny. Advisory organization estimation
of ultimate costs for claims already incurred (known as loss develop-
17 The original version of this paper stated that advisory rates had already been
discontinued. In his comments on the paper, J. Robert Hunter pointed out that this was
not the case.256 Scott E. Harrington
ment) probably would survive; forecasting of costs for future claims
(known as trending) almost certainly would not. Legislation has been
introduced in the U.S. House by Rep. Jack Brooks (D., Texas) that would
virtually repeal the insurance industry’s antitrust exemption.18
Rationale for the Antitrust Exemption
The cost of insurance rate-making for any of the hundreds of lines
and sublines of coverage is largely fixed. Loss forecasting involves the
estimation of ultimate claim costs on claims already incurred, using data
on paid claims, and prediction of claim costs for new and renewal
coverage using this and other information. Advisory organizations pool
information from a large number of insurers and forecast losses, and
make the results available to companies at cost for use as they see fit. It
is argued that this process lowers the cost of rate-making, reduces entry
barriers, and increases forecast accuracy (and thus lowers insolvency
risk), especially for small insurers with few data of their own. Cooper-
ative development of policy forms also reduces fixed costs, facilitates
comparisons of price and quality of service by consumers, and helps
make claim cost data comparable across companies.
Centralized production of information by advisory organizations
obviously is much less costly than if the same activities were duplicated
by many firms. Whether the development of prospective loss costs by
advisory organizations yields significant efficiency gains depends on
their value in improving individual insurer forecasts. This in turn
depends on many factors, including the extent to which firms can infer
information of other firms from their behavior or from prices. If the
information provided by advisory organizations has significant value, its
availability at low cost is likely to increase its use and to reduce forecast
error variance and thus capital requirements. The result would be lower
prices for any given level of insolvency risk. Of course, this result
assumes that the cooperative activity does not produce active or tacit
collusion.
The Antitrust Exemption in Practice
Dramatic growth in commercial liability insurance premiums be-
tween 1984 and 1986 produced allegations that insurers were colluding
to raise rates above costs and calls for the Congress to modify or repeal
the McCarran-Ferguson Act (Angoff 1988). A 1988 federal antitrust suit
18 The bill includes safe harbors for sharing of data on paid claims and estimation of
costs for claims already incurred. It would not protect estimation of future costs following
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by the attorneys general of many states, alleging collusion in conjunc-
tion with changes in the principal general liability insurance coverage
form, was subsequently dismissed but generated substantial negative
publicity for the antitrust exemption.19
A large amount of research dealing with causes of the mid 1980s
liability insurance crisis concludes that collusion is an implausible
explanation and suggests a variety of economic factors that led to these
problems (Clarke et al. 1988; Harrington 1988; Harrington and Litan
1988; Winter 1988; Priest 1987; and Cummins and Danzon 1990). In
general, the industry is ill-suited for cartel behavior given its competitive
structure, heterogeneity, and multiplicity of product lines. There is no
evidence that modern advisory organizations attempt to compel the use
of prospective loss costs (or advisory rates). Moreover, commercial
liability insurance pricing is characterized by substantial flexibility,
including the widespread use of individual risk rating, which is prima
facie inconsistent with price fixing. In auto insurance, most of the major
insurers file their own rates as opposed to using advisory organization
data (Danzon 1983; Eisenach 1985).
The outlook for changes in the McCarran-Ferguson Act is uncertain.
Support for curtailment or elimination of the antitrust exemption has
come from consumer groups and from persons with strong faith in the
efficacy of antitrust law. It is likely that some supporters of federal
insurance regulation favor change in the Act because it will erode the
primacy of state regulation. Insurers and trade groups are divided on
the subject. Some insurer trade groups apparently are willing to com-
promise and accept some change in the exemption. Other insurers are
willing to repeal the exemption in exchange for an exemption from state
rate regulation.
Substantial change in the McCarran-Ferguson Act’s antitrust ex-
emption almost certainly will not enhance the affordability and avail-
ability of coverage. At worst, it will produce higher prices and less
stability. The only certainty is that a significant change (such as
enactment of the Brooks bill) will produce a large amount of uncertainty
about what is legal and the possibility of substantial litigation. The likely
result is a significant transfer of resources to the legal profession.
19 A similar state antitrust suit in Texas was settled in 1991. Ayres and Seligman (1989)
and Priest (1989) provide opposing economic views of the antitrust suit. Priest presents a
compelling case that the anticompetitive story of Ayres and Seligman is without significant
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Conclusions
The case for federal regulation of insurance company solvency is
not compelling. Federal intervention could set the stage for significant,
inefficient expansion in government guarantees of insurer obligations.
What would promote efficiency is the greater reliance on market
discipline that would be induced by reducing guaranty fund protection
for commercial insurance buyers. Holding the line on guaranty fund
protection, and, if possible, reducing its scope, is probably the single
most important step that can be taken to ensure the financial integrity of
the insurance industry.
Additional government control over insurance rates is not needed.
It would be likely to produce significant inefficiency, including higher
claim costs. Instead, rates should be deregulated, and insurance afford-
ability problems should be addressed by measures that reduce claim
costs in .efficient ways. Finally, changing the insurance industry’s
antitrust exemption will not reduce insolvencies, make insurance more
affordable, or dampen volatility in prices and availability. It could make
these problems much worse.
References
Angoff, Jay. 1988. "Insurance Against Competition: How the McCarran-Ferguson Act
Raises Prices and Profits in the Property-Casualty Insurance Industry." Yale Journal on
Regulation, vol. 5, pp. 397-415.
Ayres, Ian and Peter Seligman. 1989. "The Economics of the Insurance Antitrust Suits:
Toward an Exclusionary Theory." Tulane Law Review, vol. 63, pp. 971-97.
Clarke, Richard N., Frederick Warren-Boulton, David K. Smith, and Marilyn J. Simon.
1988. "Sources of the Crisis in Liability Insurance: An Empirical Analysis." Yale Journal
on Regulation, vol. 5, pp. 367-95.
Consumer Federation of America et al. 1989. "Reducing Auto Insurance Rates: A
Comprehensive Program." Washington, D.C.: Consumer Federation of America.
Crocker, Keith J. and Arthur Snow. 1986. "The Efficiency Effects of Categorical Discrim-
ination in the Insurance Industry." Journal of Political Economy, vol. 94, pp. 321-44.
Cummins, J. David and Patricia M. Danzon. 1990. "Price Shocks and Capital Flows in
Liability Insurance." Working Paper, Department of Insurance and Risk Manage-
ment, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA.
Cummins, J. David and Sharon Tennyson. 1991. "Controlling Automobile Insurance
Costs." The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania.
Dahlby, Bev and Douglas S. West. 1986. "Price Dispersion in an Automobile Insurance
Market." Journal of Political Economy, vol. 94, pp. 418-38.
Danzon, Patricia M. 1983. "Rating Bureaus in U.S. Property-Liability Insurance Markets:
Anti- or Pro-Competitive?" Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance, vol. 8, pp. 371-402.
Dingell, John D. Chair. 1990. Failed Promises--Insurance Company Insolvencies. Report by the
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Energy and
Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives.
Eisenach, Jeffrey A. !985. "The Role of Collective Pricing in Auto Insurance." Ph.D. thesis,
University of Virginia, and Staff Report, U.S. Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of
Economics.
Finsinger, Jorg and Mark V. Pauly. 1984. "Reserve Levels and Reserve Requirements forPUBLIC POLICY AND PROPERTY-LIABILITY INSURANCE 259
Profit-Maximizing Insurance Firms." In Bamberg, G. and K. Spremann, eds., Risk and
Capital. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
Grabowski, Henry W., Kip Viscusi, and William N. Evans. 1989. "Price and Availability
Tradeoffs of Automobile Insurance Regulation." Journal of Risk and Insurance, vol. 56,
pp. 275-99.
Harrington, Scott E. 1988. "Prices and Profits in the Liability Insurance Market." In Robert
E. Litan and Clifford Winston, eds., Liability: Perspectives and Policy. Washington, D.C.:
The Brookings Institution.
--. 1990. "Competition and Regulation in the Automobile Insurance Market." Paper
presented at American Bar Association National Institute on Insurance Competition
and Pricing in the 1990s, Baltimore, MD, June 2-3.
--. 1991. "Regulation of Insurance Company Solvency." Regulation: Cato Review of
Business and Government. In press.
Harrington, Scott E. and Patricia M. Danzon. 1991. "Price Cutting in Liability Insurance
Markets," Paper presented at annual meeting of American Law and Economics
Association, Champaign, IL, May 24-25.
Harrington, Scott E. and Robert E. Litan. 1988. "Causes of the Liability Insurance Crisis."
Science, vol. 239, pp. 737-41.
Insurance Services Office. 1989. 1988 Insurer Financial Results. New York, NY.
Joskow, Paul. 1973. "Cartels, Competition, and Regulation in the Property-Liability
Insurance Industry." Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, vol. 4, pp.
375-427.
Keeton, William R. and Evan Kwerel. 1984. "Externalities in Automobile Insurance and
the Uninsured Driver Problem." Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 27, pp. 149-80.
Klein, Robert W. 1989. "Competition in Private Passenger Automobile Insurance: A
Report to the Personal Lines (C) Subcommittee." National Association of Insurance
Commissioners.
Kunreuther, Howard, Paul R. Kleindorfer, and Mark V. Pauly. 1983. "Insurance Regula-
tion and Consumer Behavior in the United States." Journal of Institutional and
Theoretical Economics, vol. 139, pp. 452-72.
McCauley, John J. and Alan Siemek. 1990. "The P/C Industry--Next on the Bailout List?"
Best’s Review, Property-Liability, vol. 91, October, pp. 17-18, 20, 108.
Munch, Patricia and Dennis Smallwood. 1981. "Theory of Solvency Regulation in the
Property and Casualty Insurance Industry." In Gary Fromm, ed., Studies in Public
Regulation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
National Association of Insurance Commissioners. 1990. "State Actions to Improve
Insurance Solvency Regulation." Kansas City, KS: NAIC.
Priest, George L. 1987. "The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law." Yale Law
Journal, vol. 96, pp. 1521-90.
--. 1989. "The Antitrust Suits and the Public Understanding of Insurance." Tulane Law
Review, vol. 63, pp. 999-1044.
Romer, Thomas and Barry R. Weingast. 1990. "Political Foundations of the Thrift
Debacle." Paper presented at CEPR Conference on Reform of Deposit Insurance and
Regulation of Depository Institutions, Washington, D.C., May 18-19.
Rottenberg, Simon. 1989. "The Cost of Regulated Pricing: A Critical Analysis of Auto
Insurance Premium Rate-Setting in Massachusetts." Boston, MA: Pioneer Institute for
Policy Research.
Shavell, Steven. 1979. "On Moral Hazard and Insurance." Quarterly Journal of Economics,
vol. 93, pp. 541~2.
Stevenson, Merril. 1990. "A Question of Balance: A Survey of American Insurance." The
Economist, October 27, pp. $5-$20.
Winter, Ralph A. 1988. "The Liability Crisis and the Dynamics of Competitive Insurance
Markets." Yale Journal on Regulation, vol. 5, pp. 455-99.Discussion
J. Robert Hunter*
The positions expressed in Scott E. Harrington’s paper represent an
effort in what I would term forensic scholarship. His point of view is
similar to the positions taken by his insurance industry clients. Con-
sider, for instance, how Harrington strains to make points favorable to
long-standing positions held by insurers:
(1) He writes that "efficiency would be served by deregulation of
rates," and at the same time suggests maintaining the antitrust
exemption. What could be nicer for insurance companies than
deregulated cartel pricing? What could be worse for America’s
insurance consumers?
(2) He finds that solvency is adversely affected by insurance "un-
certainty," totally ignoring the fact that studies of the riskiness
of property-casualty insurance reveal average risk. Indeed,
although insurers claim below-average returns over the last two
decades, the property-casualty insurer stock index rose more
than twice as fast as the Dow Jones Industrial Average.
(3) He writes that "allegations that property-liability insurer insol-
vencies are due mainly to incompetence and moral turpitude are
exaggerated and incomplete." Yet, elsewhere he notes that
the Dingell report concluded that some insurers pursued "high-
risk strategies," they were led "to ’go for broke’," that insurers
engage in "deliberate understatement of reserves," and that
some general liability insurers deliberately and massively un-
derstated loss reserves.
*President, National Insurance Consumer Organization.DISCUSSION 261
(4)
(5)
Harrington writes, "Based on theory, it is highly probable that
guaranty funds contributed to the increased frequency and
severity of insolvencies in recent years," noting that "large
commercial buyers" are better able to assess the financial
strength of low-cost insurers. Why would a sophisticated buyer
with millions at risk for liabilities to third parties want a $300,000
cap from a guaranty fund? Not to mention all the wait and
hassle to collect property claims from a guaranty fund?
Harrington finds a competitively structured market for proper-
ty-liability insurance, but ignores the serious blocks to compe-
tition that a study of insurer conduct reveals: the antitrust
exemption; the anti-rebate laws (a type of fair trade law, where
the retail-level or agent price can be set and enforced by the
wholesaler or insurer); and the anti-group laws (whereby peo-
ple are not permitted to join together to buy insurance). He
makes passing comment on the total barrier to bank entry, but
not on the severe economic barrier to entry into direct writing of
insurance, where the real competition for personal lines insur-
ance occurs. He mentions, but fails to explore, the information
barriers people face in trying to find the proper price/service
information on insurers. He fails to mention the fear that
consumers have of moving from insurer to insurer, because of
the total freedom of underwriting and cancellation during the
first 60 days of coverage with a new insurer, in most states.
In this discussion I hope to disabuse Harrington of the recommen-
dations that I believe to be anti-consumer, namely, those that would:
(1) Maintain the status quo as to state regulation of solvency, and
decrease the coverage of the guaranty funds, particularly for
commercial risks;
(2) Deregulate rates; and
(3) Maintain the antitrust exemption. (Harrington opines that free-
ing insurers from the cartel might produce even higher prices
and less stability.)
Solvency/Guaranty Fund Issues
The real reason for the recent increase in insolvencies was the
property-casualty insurance cycle, which bottomed in the mid 1980s and
which I believe was itself caused by greed and/or incompetence of manag-
ers and incompetence of state regulators. Harrington lists the cycle only
third among possible culprits. He believes that the first cause was reserve
shortfall, and shows an exhibit (Harrington Figure 2) that indicates that in
the early 1980s reserves were short by $1 billion to $4 billion, yet he does262 J. Robert Hunter
not comment on the $1 billion to $2 billion reserve excess since 1985. This
is simply classic cyclical behavior: keep reserves low when your profits fall,
jack them up when they are great. Harrington’s chart demonstrates that
the cycle was a primary reason for the shortfall.
His second point, that bonds were down when interest rates were
high, is interesting but also shows a misunderstanding of the property-
liability business. Bonds are carried on the books at amortized value and
are well matched with the "tail" of expected payouts. Thus, bond prices
are, for most insurers, irrelevant to solvency.
The cycle was the culprit, driven by greed and mismanagement. As
the head of American International Group (AIG) put it, if the insurers
hadn’t cut prices "to the point of absurdity," there wouldn’t be "all this
hullabaloo" about tort reform (Greenwald 1985).
State regulation has not worked well in the area of solvency. It has
been too slow, and the problem with the guaranty associations is not
that they cover too much, but too little.
As a 1991 study by the General Accounting Office found (p. 3):
Insurance regulators were typically late in taking formal action against
financially troubled companies .... There are many possible reasons for
regulatory delay. Among them are reliance on untimely or unverified
information, lack of legal or regulatory standards for defining a troubled
insurer, and a vague and unspecific statutory definition of insolvency.
I believe the case for federal minimum standards for solvency
regulation is compelling. That the feds might set standards does not
mean I favor a federal takeover of solvency regulation. I do not. I would
hope that all states would meet the minimum standards and fully retain
state regulation, except for areas that states may be unable to regulate,
such as alien reinsurance and alien surplus lines markets. In these cases
only, direct federal regulation may be necessary.
Relative to the guaranty associations, the coverage for personal lines
and small ("ma and pa") commercial insurers should be expanded, not
weakened. Harrington’s call for elimination of commercial coverage should
never extend to small business. Further, his lack of concern for the victims
of corporate wrongdoing is alarming. Consider his suggestion of no
coverage for commercial risks. Suppose the insurer of a product manufac-
turer fails. Assume further that the product is one lille the Dalkon Shield,
and that many women have been seriously injured by the product. I
personally do not mind if large commercial enterprises such as A.H. Robins
(the manufacturer of Dalkon) are liable in the event the insurer fails. But
what if A.H. Robins also goes under? Should the women have no claim
even then against the guaranty fund? Why further victimize them because
both the insurer and the manufacturer failed?DISCUSSION 263
Deregulation of Rates
If Harrington would agree to eliminate all of the anti-competitive
forces at play in the property-casualty insurance markets (the antitrust
exemption, the anti-rebate laws, the anti-group laws, the barriers to
entry for banks, the information gap, the underwriting selection prob-
lem, at least for risks with good records, and the like), I could then agree
that regulation of prices could be eased, even phased out. If the full
forces of competition were at work, I would see no need for much rate
regulation. But the quality of competition should be tested.
It is vital to repeal the McCarran-Ferguson Act’s antitrust exemp-
tion, in order to start a process whereby states can choose to deregulate
by eliminating their local anti-competitive rules, by establishing com-
puterized price and service information, and so on. Alternatively, a state
could choose to regulate, but the standard by which the courts would
test the efficacy of regulation would be the state action doctrine rather
than the non-standards of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.1
If regulation is chosen, it should be real. As the National Associa-
tion of Insurance Commissioners has found:
The (NAIC) Task Force concludes that total return ratemaking method-
ologies are the most appropriate . . . for states that choose to regulate rates.2
Years of state coddling under weak to useless regulations, coupled
with no antitrust enforcement, have produced what we would expect,
an amazingly inefficient, fat industry. Andrew Tobias, a financial
author, put it this way (1982, pp. 24-25):
Roots of the industry’s inefficiency are manifold. The fire insurance busi-
ness grew up as a massive exercise in price-fixing .... One might expect the
marketplace to impose its own economic discipline--it is competition based on
price that has always been the surest spur to efficiency--but insurance prices...
are notoriously hard to evaluate, leaving consumers unable to spot the best
values and insurers under little pressure to provide them. Federal regulation and
antitrust statutes largely exempt the insurance industry; state regulators are
anxious to keep even inefficient companies profitable ....
If the market were truly competitive, good service would be
expected to cost more, not less. Yet, when Consumer Reports listed the
l Under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, any law purporting to regulate insurance--even
if unenforced~is sufficient to oust antitrust scrutiny. Under state action, the quality of
regulation can be challenged by an abused consumer.
2 The full NAIC adopted this report on June 6, 1984.264 J. Robert Hunter




Amica Mutual Insurance Co.
(Best Ranking) 36.5
United Services Auto Assn. 26.0
USAA Casualty 32,0
Auto-Owners Insurance Co. 36.7
Cincinnati Insurance Co. 42.9
Average 34,6






Company of America 36.5
Metropolitan Property & Liability 39,0
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company 26.9
Travelers Indemnity 45.4
Average 39.0
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3 Consumer Reports, October 1988 edition. The 1989 expense ratio is for private
passenger auto liability insurance, taken from Aggregates and Averages, A.M. Best & Co.,
1990 edition. The ratio includes loss adjustment expense.
4 Consumer Reports, September 1989 edition. The 1989 expense ratio is for homeown-
ers’ insurance, taken from Aggregates and Averages, A.M. Best & Co., 1990 edition. The ratio
includes loss adjustment expense.DISCUSSION




Metropolitan Property & Liability
(Worst Ranking) 39.4
Prudential Property & Casualty 42.0
Travelers Indemnity 47.8
Allstate Insurance 37.4
Fireman’s Fund Insurance 61,9
Average 45.7
Based on reviewing this sort of information for many years, looking
at complaint ratio information from many states, and 30 years of study
of the markets for insurance, I find no evidence that enough people
know which are the low-cost, good-service insurers to justify the heroic
conclusion that competition can regulate price in insurance. In fact,
since the lower-cost insurers probably produce higher service satisfac-
tion overall than the high-cost insurers, you would expect the latter to be
long out of business, but they are not.
The high cost and the inefficiency of insurers are now getting
national attention. The monopoly rents this industry has enjoyed can be
found in its fat and waste. The insurance industry is headed for a tough
period as it adjusts to either a properly regulated or a properly com-
petitive market, following the coming repeal of the antitrust exemption,
the onslaught of foreign competitors, and the inevitable entry of banks.
The Antitrust Exemption
Harrington fails to point out that after extensive review, the U.S.
Department of Justice under President Ford and President Carter’s
Antitrust Commission both recommended repeal or amendment of the
McCarran-Ferguson antitrust exemption. His paper alleges that rate
bureaus no longer produce final rates. This is incorrect. We have only
just begun the promised change to "prospective loss costs." In some
lines of insurance, final rates are still filed everywhere.
Even if this promise to go to "prospective loss costs" comes to
fruition, it will not end the joint speculation about things like next year’s
inflation rate and other key future factors that should be estimated on a
company-by-company basis, if this market is ever to become fully
competitive.266 J. Robert Hunter
Background of the ISO Change
The Insurance Services Office, Inc. (ISO) traditionally has provided
insurers with "advisory" rates made up of two parts: pure premiums (or
projected loss costs) based on a complex equation formula that incorpo-
rates factors such as trending, loss development, inflation, and the
like--this represents about 60 percent of the final premium--and a
factor to load in expenses and profits representing about 40 percent. The
latter factor is determined as a simple single "multiplier" by which the
expenses and profits are loaded into the pure premium.
Why the ISO "Change" Is Meaningless
ISO promises to provide only the complex 60 percent part, the pure
premium or prospective loss costs. It will provide all the data and
calculations except the multiplier to factor in the final 40 percent. But
ISO will "help" insurers fill in this one missing blank in the equation by
providing training and a circular (a sort of "cookbook") that describes
for insurers precisely how to convert the prospective loss cost data into
a final rate. Significantly, the one-step multiplication factor used for this
purpose means that insurers will continue to rely on ISO trend and loss
development data, the key to price-fixing practices. Critical components
of the ultimate premium, which should be calculated independently by
insurers based on their individual judgment and experience, will con-
tinue to be formulated by ISO. Those components include, for example,
labor costs, inflation factors, loss adjustment expenses, and so on. Thus,
significant price-fixing would continue even under the new ISO ap-
proach, even if the insurers do not adopt the method and data needed
to calculate the ISO final rate.
In 1985, the National Underwriter noted the end of the soft market by
reporting that [in general liability] "what has occurred.., is a return to
basic ISO rating subject to a minimum 20 percent surcharge..." (pp. 8, 82).
Harrington argues that there is no evidence that the antitrust
exemption and the availability of jointly set prices had any impact on the
industry relative to the so-called "liability crisis" of the mid 1980s. He is
mistaken. As the New York Attorney General testified before Congress
on June 3, 1991, evidence exists of collusive price-fixing during that
period, but the Attorney General cannot file a lawsuit simply because of
the McCarran-Ferguson exemption. Mr. Sampson said:
Our two-year investigation revealed an industry in which collusion is the
norm, not the exception. We found numerous anticompetitive acts that
would have invited criminal prosecution in any other industry. These
included price-fixing schemes of all varieties, market allocation agreements
between competitors, and tying arrangements that forced unwilling insur-
ance buyers to purchase unwanted coverages in order to get the coverageDISCUSSION 267
they needed. We could have included these allegations in our lawsuits, and
would have done so were it not for the futility of doing so in the face of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act.
The climate of collusion we found was a major contributing factor to the
insurance crisis of 1985-86. The sharp swings within the industry as a whole
were not the result of mere coincidence, but rather evidence of a lockstep
mentality and an absence of real competition. Although there were thou-
sands of insurance carriers across the country, the direction of the market was
set by precious few companies, the same companies which dominated the
industry trade association.
Smaller carriers blindly followed the price hikes and market withdrawals
of their largest competitors, emboldened by their trade association leadership
who was constantly calling on its members to raise their prices "for the good
of the industry." These factors transformed a gentle swing in the pattern of
prices within the industry to an avalanche of destructive pricing conspiracies.
It is of little solace to insurance consumers who were victims of these
price-fixing conspiracies that the Attorneys General were finally able, after
several years of investigation, to bring antitrust actions alleging boycott,
coercion and intimidation. Were this any other industry, without this
exemption, we could have also brought price-fixing actions (which are easier
to prove than boycott cases), thereby providing consumers with full relief for
all of the injuries they suffered. The McCarran-Ferguson Act effectively
handcuffs our offices, taking away a large part of our antitrust arsenal.
Because they believe that competition is weakened when price-
fixing is allowed, a number of groups support McCarran-Ferguson
reform.5 Even parts of the insurance industry have decided to work for
some changes in the broad exemption to the nation’s normal business
rules. The American Insurance Association has shown flexibility and has
proposed a safe harbors approach. The Alliance of American Insurers
has shown some softening on this issue.
Harrington claims that repeal of the antitrust exemption will not
5 These include Small Business Legislative Council; Consumers Union; National
Federation of Business and Professional Women’s Clubs (BPW/USA); National Council of
Senior Citizens; U.S. Public Interest Research Group; American Federation of Labor--
Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO); Consumer Federation of America;
American Association of Nurse Anesthetists; Texas, Colorado, and Illinois Associations of
Nurse Anesthetists; National Insurance Consumer Organization; Consumer Bankers
Association; American Association of Retired Persons; Amalgamated Transit Union;
Environmental Policy Institute; Environmental Action; Public Citizen’s Congress Watch;
National Association of Women Business Owners; Women’s Equity Action League;
American Nurses Association; Association of American Physicians and Surgeons; National
Association of Attorneys General; American Bankers Association; Business and Profes-
sional Women; Citicorp; American Association of University Women; National Women’s
Health Network; Federal Trade Commission; American Association of Colleges of Nurs-
ing; American Society for Medical Technology; Automotive Service Association; Citizen
Action; American Bar A~sociat~on; Society of Collision Repair Specialists (SCRS); and
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lower insurance prices. He goes so far as to say that "At worst, it will
produce even higher prices." It appears that Harrington has found the
secret to lower prices that has eluded all others since Adam Smith--
create cartels to lower prices. But, again, he is in error. As the GAO
found in 1986 in looking at the results of introducing competition into
workers’ compensation insurance markets (p. 32):
Four states--Michigan, Illinois, Minnesota, and Oregon--prepared reports
on the impact of competitive rating. Each of these states reported substantial
declines in the cost of workers’ compensation.
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Robert E. Litan*
Scott Harrington has provided an excellent overview of what is, for
the most part, the consensus view among academic scholars on the
subjects of solvency and rate regulation of the property-liability insur-
ance industry. I agree with most of what he has to say. But I disagree
with Harrington’s rejection of a role for federal solvency regulation. I
also draw some broader lessons from the S&L crisis than Harrington
provides in his paper.
State vs. Federal Solvency Regulation
Harrington is generally comfortable with continued state regula-
tion, noting that between 1984 and 1989 guaranty fund assessments
totaled less than one-half of I percent of nationwide premiums. He also
suggests that the four large property-liability insurer failures discussed
in Representative John Dingell’s Failed Promises report may have been
due as much to unexpected increases in claims costs as to deliberate
under-reserving and underpricing. Accordingly, Harrington apparently
finds little fault in state regulation in these cases.
I disagree. In my view, the Dingell report makes a persuasive case
that these insurers did understate their loss reserves and did engage in
reckless patterns of expansion, activities that state insurance regulators
should have caught. The fact that A.M. Best had given these companies
high ratings up to the time that regulatory actions were taken is cause
*Senior Fellow, Economic Studies Program and Director, Center for Economic
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for criticizing the rating agency, not for excusing state regulators. The
same point goes for the accountants who audited these insurers. With
the level of losses these insurer failures will ultimately entail, someone
in the regulatory agencies had to be asleep at the switch.
In addition, while I agree with Harrington that the insurer in-
solvency problem is currently not alarming--at least when compared
to insolvency costs in the banking and thrift industries, which over
the past decade have probably exceeded $250 billion by historical stan-
dards, the numbers of insurer failures and their costs during
the past several years are up sharply. While the general economic climate
in both segments of the insurance industry has not been favorable, state
regulation cannot escape its share of responsibility for the insolvencies. It is
well known that failed insurers generally were poorly managed and
apparently in many cases were looted by their managers or owners. At the
very least, the regulators could have been far more aggressive in limiting
the growth of the "problem" insurers on their watch.
The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) has
effectively admitted as much and is now implementing an accreditation
program for state insurance departments. Although Harrington believes
the evidence is unclear, there is no doubt in my mind that the spectre of
federal regulation that Dingell has made so real accounts for the NAIC’s
sudden "religion" on solvency matters.
Harrington apparently believes that the NAIC’s efforts will prove to
be sufficient. The General Accounting Office has recently reached the
opposite conclusion, pointing to the weak power the NAIC has over
individual state regulators. Dingell apparently agrees, because he is
promoting a plan that would require state insurance regulators to meet
minimum federal standards. Little support appears to exist, however,
for totally replacing state insurance regulators with federal regulators.
I do not advocate such an extreme step either, but I see much more
merit in allowing insurers to choose federal regulation. Specifically, much as
banks have the choice whether to be chartered and regulated by the states
or the federal government, insurers could be given a choice whether they
want to be regulated, for solvency purposes only--consumer protection
would remain with the states--by the states or by the federal government.
If they chose the federal option, insurers would join a national guaranty
fund system. Equally significant, by choosing the federal option insurers
would be free from state rate regulation. And if the McCarran-Ferguson
Act has not yet been repealed for all insurers, then the antitrust protection
provided in McCarran-Ferguson would not apply, outside of some "safe
harbors" for data collection and trending, for federally regulated insurers.
Such an option has at least two important advantages. First, it
recognizes what both the NAIC’s accreditation program and Dingell’s
minimum standards proposal ignore: the critical link between rate
regulation and solvency. Somewhat incredibly, a state can get a sterlingDISCUSSION 271
solvency accreditation from the NAIC even though it may have a highly
restrictive regime of rate regulation that limits the profitability of all
insurers and conceivably forces some to lose money.
The Department of Insurance in California--home to what is to date
the largest insurer insolvency in U.S. history, Executive Life--has
recently proposed, for example, that property-liability insurers in that
state be limited to earning a "reasonable rate of return" on surplus only
up to some specified ceilings (set on a line-by-line basis). In testimony
that I have just given on behalf of State Farm, I calculated that if applied
on a nationwide basis, the California ceilings would mean that the
property-liability insurance industry collectively could not earn a mar-
ket rate of return on approximately $50 billion of its $139 billion in
surplus. At a time when the public is concerned about the sufficiency of
capital in its banking, thrift, and--yes--insurance industries, it is
somewhat incredible that any state, let alone the largest one in the
country, can even be thinking about adopting policies that would
discourage insurers from being well capitalized. And to make this effort
even more bizarre, it comes at a time when California’s insurance
commissioner has asked the federal government to help rescue policy-
holders of Executive Life who reside in California.
Given the public concern over mounting insurance costs, it would
be surprising if more states did not follow the lead of California and
New Jersey and attempt to impose restrictive rate regimes, notwith-
standing the criticisms that Harrington and other economists have
effectively marshalled against such an approach. Not only will addi-
tional rate regulation aggravate the insurance availability problem and
contribute to the growth of residual markets, but carried out long
enough and on a sufficiently large scale, it will lead to more insurer
failures. Such an outcome can be prevented by using the availability of
a federal solvency option, coupled with preemption of state regulation,
to discipline states that have not yet understood that rate and solvency
regulation ultimately are inconsistent.
Second, the national guaranty fund that would be created as part of
a federal solvency regulatory scheme would provide more effective
protection for policyholders of failed companies. Under the current
system, policyholders in each state must look only to the guaranty funds
in their states, whose annual assessments on the insurers doing busi-
ness there are capped, generally in the neighborhood of 1 percent of
premiums collected in the state. As a result, state guaranty funds can
face significant cash flow constraints when honoring claims of large
failed insurers, limitations that can force claims payments to policyhold-
ers to be stretched out over time.
A national guaranty fund, even with the same annual assessment
caps, would be better able to handle the costs of large insurer failures
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with Harrington that guaranty fund protection should be curtailed for
many commercial policies, I do not see any case for opposing devices
that would better ensure that personal policyholder claims are paid on a
timely basis rather than spread out over many years.
Admittedly, a significant "adverse selection" problem may occur
with a federal solvency option. Other things equal, it would be likely
to attract the largest nationwide insurers least in need of the McCarran
antitrust protection for joint data collection. The withdrawal of the
large companies from the state guaranty funds would leave those funds
more exposed to cash flow and perhaps ultimate funding constraints,
in the event of large failures of insurers still belonging to the state
systems. Over time, as consumers learned of the greater dangers
associated with state insurers, business would gravitate to the federal
insurers, leaving the states with dwindling regulatory responsibilities.
This pessimistic scenario need not occur, however, if the states fight
back by convincing consumers that they, too, have strong solvency
regulatory programs. In the process, the states would learn that rate
restrictions are antithetical to ensuring solvency. And that is precisely
why a federal solvency option might be just the thing that induces the
states to avoid or repeal any rate regulation.
Forcing the states to compete with the federal government in
regulating insurer solvency might also induce them to look for other,
more productive ways to reduce insurance premiums. Specifically, I
have in mind proposals for true no-fault auto insurance, which I believe
could significantly lower auto insurance premiums, coupled with selec-
tive tort reforms that have already lowered liability insurance premiums
in the states that have adopted them, as Blackmon and Zeckhauser
(1991) have demonstrated.
Broader Lessons from the S&L Crisis
Most reporters, it seems, cannot write about the recent upturn in
insurer insolvencies without drawing a comparison to the savings and loan
disaster. Similarly, the Failed Promises report by the Oversight and Investi-
gations Subcommittee of the House Energy and Commerce Committee
begins with a warning that federal policymakers not let happen to the
insurance industry what happened to thrifts. Harrh~gton, too, draws a
lesson from the S&L crisis: that regulatory forbearance considerably raised
the cost of resolving the thrift mess and therefore should not be repeated in
the case of insurers.
Ironically, however, Harrington’s recommendation that guaranty
funds continue to stick with the post-insolvency assessment method of
finance could in fact facilitate the forbearance policy he elsewhere
abhors. It is true in theory that requiring healthy insurers to pay forDISCUSSION 273
failed insurers after the fact may give them strong incentives to pressure
regulators to close or merge troubled insurers on a timely basis. But in
fact, as a recent General Accounting Office report (1991) documents,
many state insurance regulators have been late closing insolvent insur-
ers, suggesting that the incentives are not as strong as Harrington and
others may postulate. One reason why is that, as I have already
indicated, the post-insolvency assessments on insurers are capped,
typically at 1 to 2 percent of premiums.
Another potentially more important reason, however, is that pre-
cisely because insurers’ post-insolvency assessments are highly depen-
dent on the pace of insurer closures, state insurance departments that
may otherwise be too close to the insurers they regulate may hesitate to
close troubled insurers too quickly, for fear of unnecessarily increasing
the assessment costs incurred by healthy insurers. If insurers paid fixed
assessments on a pre-insolvency basis, like banks, then guaranty funds
could build up positive balances and insurance regulators could then
proceed to close troubled insurers, safe in the knowledge that the costs
of doing so would not change the costs of healthy insurers in that year.
Indeed, the reason why thrift regulators engaged in forbearance was
that they had insufficient funds to do otherwise. Insurance regulators
are in an even worse situation: they have no funds at all unless they
raise them after the fact, and even then their annual assessments on
healthy insurers are capped by statute.
Of course, I recognize the strong countervailing reasons for continuing
with the post-insolvency assessment system. Among them is the danger
that guaranty fund surpluses will be raided by state governments eager to
avoid running deficits. But if this is the problem with pre-funded guaranty
systems, it can be cured by creating a federal guaranty program. Until
recently, the FDIC has had ample reserves, invested in Treasury securities
to be sure, but still worth 100 cents on the dollar. The same cannot be said
of state governments that may raid their insurer guaranty funds and stuff
them with state government bonds which, as events are demonstrating,
can trade at prices well below 100 cents on the dollar.
Much broader lessons can be learned from the thrift crisis, however,
which are not discussed in Harrington’s paper but which I believe are
central to any effort to prevent future insurer insolvencies. As a number of
observers have pointed out, the thrift crisis of the 1980s was, in significant
part, the product of major policy errors of the 1970s. Specifically, had
Congress adopted the recommendations of the Hunt Commission in the
early 1970s to lift deposit interest rate ceilings then and to permit thrifts to
extend adjustable-rate mortgages, thrifts would have been far better
positioned to have avoided the huge "interest rate shock" of the late 1970s
and early 1980s. Rather than being stuck with low-interest fixed-rate
mortgages when deposit interest costs soared, thrifts would have had
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And by largely avoiding the "maturity mismatch" of the early 1980s, many
fewer thrifts would have had their capital depleted, the situation that gave
rise to massive "gambling for resurrection" during the rest of the decade
when Congress and the Administration failed to provide sufficient funds to
close down insolvent institutions.
In short, the thrift crisis was far more than a failure of adequate
supervision, or what I would call the "green eyeshade" aspect of solvency
regulation. The S&L disaster had its roots in the flawed institutional design
of the thrift industry itself~the requirement that thrifts borrow short and
then lend long at fixed rates---that cracked when the macroeconomic
environment produced double-digit interest rates.
Similarly, I find that much of the current discussion about insurer
insolvency is of the "green eyeshade" variety: that we need better
supervisors and more of them, and that perhaps the federal government
rather than the states should be in charge of supervision. And so on.
Don’t get me wrong. All of these issues are important; after all, I have
spent most of my discussion time on them. But ultimately, the gravest
dangers to insurer solvency in my view come not from flaws in the
supervisory structure, but from major exogenous events for which we as a
society--and the insurance industry in particular--are ill-prepared.
One such event is a massive earthquake--with far greater destruc-
tive power than the Loma Prieta quake that hit California nearly two
years ago--that scientists project is quite likely to strike at some point in
the next several decades, not necessarily in California but perhaps near
Memphis, Seattle, or any number of other locations around the country.
By various estimates, the insured losses from such an event could rise as
high as $50 billion, or enough to wipe out more than one-third of the
capital in the property-liability insurance industry.
The second event could be even more devastating: a series of court
rulings holding insurers responsible for potentially hundreds of billions of
dollars in costs for cleaning up hazardous waste sites. Thus far, insurers
appear to have won most of the cases that have been brought on this
subject, with courts holding that the "sudden and accidental" exclusion in
the general commercial policy means what it appears to say--that com-
mercial policies do not cover continued releases of hazardous substances
over many years. Nevertheless, a sufficient number of court rulings go in
the other direction to raise the spectre that insurers will have to honor very
large environmental claims costs that they surely did not think they were
covering when they wrote those policies many years ago.
It is tempting, of course, to say that insurers or policymakers can do
nothing now to prevent either of the events I have just described. In a
limited sense that is true. No one can prevent the next earthquake. And
who knows what juries and judges will decide in future environmental
litigations?
Nevertheless, policymakers can take steps now that would substan-DISCUSSION 275
tially minimize insurer3’ exposure to these events and that are also in the
wider public interest. As to earthquakes, policymakers could adopt a
federal reinsurance program that primary insurers could use for their
exposures to large catastrophic risks, such as a major quake. Such a
program could be set up on a fully "pay-as-you-go" basis, although if a
quake struck in the early years, the federal government would have to
be prepared to lend sufficient funds to the reinsurance corporation to
honor claims, with repayment by the insurers required thereafter over
an extended period. In addition, earthquake damage costs themselves
can be reduced by cost-effective mitigation efforts, which both the states
and the federal government can and should encourage.
Meanwhile, for the environmental risks I am sympathetic with the
American International Group proposal that would eliminate litigation
over responsibility for cleanup of past hazardous waste by establishing
a much larger cleanup fund than currently exists. The fund would be
financed with a small annual premium tax on all commercial insurance
policies and on businesses that self-insure. Such a program would
dramatically reduce both the high transactions costs and the long delays
that have plagued the hazardous waste cleanup effort for over a decade.
In the process, it would also remove the threat of tens (if not hundreds)
of billions of dollars of cleanup claims that now hangs over the insurance
industry like a Sword of Damocles.
In sum, ensuring solvency in the insurance industry is a task too
important to be left just to the auditors and the actuaries. Policymakers,
especially those at the federal level, must uncharacteristically think far
enough ahead to establish an institutional environment that will allow
insurers to remain solvent even in the face of costly adverse events.
Failure to do so, I am afraid, may mean far more insolvencies and
stranded consumers at some point in the future.
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Richard E. Stewart*
Scott Harrington’s paper on "Public Policy and Property-Liability
Insurance" addresses two important subjects--rate regulation (includ-
ing the McCarran-Ferguson Act) and insolvency. I will outline briefly
the major issues I see involved in rate regulation, and then focus my
remarks on the question of the solvency of casualty insurance compa-
nies.
Rate Regulation
While solvency is often considered to be the chief goal of insurance
regulation, rate regulation is the subject to which, for over a century, we
have actually devoted the most attention. It covers such matters as
whether to suppress, tolerate, or encourage competition; whether to
allow, support, enforce, prohibit, or have government take over and
perform standard development of policy forms, statistics, and rates; and
how to balance efficiency and fairness in rate regulation, including
questions of cross-subsidy and residual markets.
Today’s debates revisit those questions and add others. We are
struggling a bit, both because the questions are difficult and because no
one brings a broad balance of theory, analysis, history, and explicit
social policy. Today’s formulation of the rate regulation problem raises
several questions.
*Chairman of Stewart Economics, Inc.DISCUSSION 277
How Much to Rely on Competition
This requires that we define the term "competition" and develop a
way to measure it. Then we must also decide:
(1) Whether to expect and allow competition itself to take care of
pockets of insufficiency;
(2) How much to defer to cost-based pricing and whether to defer
to industry definitions and categories of cost;
(3) Whether to discourage certain kinds or amounts of expense by
not allowing them in a regulated rate;
(4) How, if at all, to deal with ability to pay, especially for a line of
insurance that is a necessity and whose pricing is regressive;
and finally,
(5) How to think about and deal with the side-effects of rate
regulation, such as effects on availability, solvency, and claims.
How to Deal with the Underwriting Cycle
No agreement has been reached among experts about whether or
not the underwriting cycle is natural and even inherent in the business.
Any determination about this will affect our attitudes about:
(1) How much interference in the cycle is desirable, manageable, or
even possible;
(2) What to do, at the next cycle turn, with the array of rebound-
suppressants now in place, including flex rating laws and
multiple-lines joint underwriting associations; and
(3) What, if anything, can and should be done to bring within
prevailing policy about the cycle the impressive array of devices
for opting out of conventional insurance and regulation, includ-
ing self-insurance, captives, and the non-admitted market.
How to Resolve Current Legal Questions
Several major legal questions now command our attention and
action, including:
(1) McCarran-Ferguson Act modification or repeal;
(2) The federal-state split of responsibility for regulation; and
(3) The state action doctrine, calling for more intensive rate regu-
lation if McCarran is no longer a basis for state jurisdiction.
Solvency
To an audience of central bankers I would recommend three initial
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insolvency. All three have to do with something’s not being something
else. First, an insurance company is not a lesser form of bank. Dr.
Johnson said a long time ago that being in a ship was like being in prison
with the added chance of drowning. Being a casualty insurer is like
being a bank with the added chance that your liabilities will get you, too.
The second thought follows from the first: When you look at trouble in
casualty insurance, it is not really an asset problem. The weakest assets
on the balance sheets for casualty insurers are not invested assets; they
are trade assets, such as reinsurance recoverables and agents’ balances.
If you see a casualty insurer with weak invested assets, probably you are
looking at a casualty insurer that years ago realized it was in some other
kind of trouble and decided to try to break its way out by shooting craps
on the left-hand side of the balance sheet. The third initial thought is
that the future is not going to be like the past, which is probably a good
thing.
W~ith those preliminaries out of the way, I would like to reflect on
three" large questions still open for discussion in the area of casualty
insurance company insolvency: Is insolvency natural or is it culpable?
What is the duty of the regulator? And who are the victims and what are
we going to do about them?
Insolvency: Natural or Culpable?
It is quite the fashion in financial institution insolvency circles these
days to speak in terms of villains. And it is not hard to see why. We are
all gardeners, and it is nice to say that everything was fine in the garden
until the snake showed up. But it leads to a lot of interesting conse-
quences. One is that everybody close to the situation feels ashamed of it,
and another is that an endless circle of recrimination can get started,
because a perpetrator can always be found. But in the line of insurance
most threatening to the solvency of insurance companies these days,
general liability, the threats are indeed systemic.
Think about it for a second. This industry has a large number of
participants and used to have, but does not have any longer, a lot of
price structuring and support. In some lines, suppression of rates and
underwriting can lead to catastrophes on the sales or revenue side.
Furthermore, this industry’s liabilities are far out in the future, and
nearly impossible to estimate for pricing or reserving purposes. The
industry’s prediction requirements have a lot more in common with
long-range weather forecasting than with something simple like predict-
ing interest rates over a five-year period. This leaves the industry
susceptible to catastrophes on the liability side. Moreover, the casualty
corner of the insurance industry is intensely competitive, usually on
price, and buyers have developed an impressive array of ways to opt outDISCUSSION 279
of the conventional insurance and regulatory system whenever they
think it is in their business interest to do so.
All this is a recipe for a type of insurance that is going to get in a lot
of trouble. The industry is selling a tremendously valuable contract,
essentially an open-ended "we will pay you if you are liable" contract.
The incentives and rewards for buyers, brokers, and regulators are
concentrated on the front end of the insurance transaction, availability
and price at the point of sale. At the same time, the pressures on the
industry are shifted to the back end of the scale, the willingness and
ability to pay claims. In our complex society, from time to time some
liability that nobody foresaw comes in over the transom and hits
grievously, right across the industry. The hit is essentially nondiversi-
fiable and too late to get into prices. It is very hard to avoid the
conclusion that insolvency is a natural outcome of having a private and
competitive business handle this kind of activity.
When we think about any industry other than the one we work in,
we tend to think that insolvency is a desirable incentive to efficiency,
and purgative of those less able to serve the needs of customers. In other
words, we think insolvency is a good thing--not fun to have it happen
to you, but a good thing that makes the whole show work better. That
being said, I believe the whole emphasis needs to change away from the
villain theory, not because there are no snakes but because the snakes
do not really cause the problem.
The Duty of the Regulator
Our attitude toward insolvency in turn affects how we approach the
second question, the duty of the regulator. You would think we would
know what it was, but I used to be one, and I was not sure. Here are the
competing possibilities. First, it is the duty of the commissioner to
prevent insolvencies. That is the usual formulation. But by saying that
while at the same time saying that insolvency is a natural, not a culpable
outcome, look what happens: you have given the regulator a duty that
essentially he cannot perform. It is akin to saying, if a company goes
insolvent on your watch, fella, you are probably one of the snakes. Early
detection and swift action to take failing companies out of the market are
best in principle, but hard to do in individual cases. It is not too hard,
however, to avoid recognizing insolvency if the problem is coming from
a kind of insurance with a 10- or 20-year time dimension and highly
inexact estimates of losses and therefore liabilities. It is no great trick to
maneuver over, say, a five-year span when a company is going to go in
any event, which normally means your successor will be in office. We
should not surround public servants, or private servants for that matter,
with that kind of incentive unless we expect them to respond to it.
So, if the duty of insurance regulators is to prevent insolvency, but280 Richard E. Stewart
in a circumstance where they no longer can do so, since the future is not
going to be like the past, we are just asking people ~o forbear, to put off
the recognition of the bad news. And in the later years of a failing
insurance company, the risks go up rather like the mortality curve in life
insurance, because management has to bet in worse and worse games.
Aid for the Victims
A third open question worth our attention is the action to aid the
victims of insurance insolvency. In the United States, we have decided
to run a large part of our system of financial compensation for accidents
through an insured civil liability system: a bad idea or good idea, but we
have chosen it. And people all over the place rely on it. Some of them
are the buyers of insurance who pick the insurance company and rely on
it for indemnity from the liability that the law places upon them. But our
society also includes a large ring of other people who did not know any
of this was going on and who ended up the victims of some mishap, call
it asbestosis, for which our legal system says that they have redress,
against somebody. Those people are widely dispersed, but in a society
whose rules include product liability, pollution liability, directors’ and
officers’ liability, and a lot of other kinds of liability, a single policyholder
can have a single course of conduct with a hundred thousand injured
people. That means that a group of diffuse and somewhat invisible and
unorganized people can be terribly hurt by the insolvency of an insurer,
on whom part of this system depends. It is inherent in the dual role of
our liability insurance system, indemnity and compensation. It just has
to be faced. It is not just major corporate America that we would be
socking it to if we withdrew one or another protection surrounding the
insurance system.
In the past, the big decisions about risk and resource allocation in
insurance were made by executives, bureaus, state legislatures, state
regulators, and private forums such as arbitration. Today authority is
dispersed, and the decision-makers include lawyers, courts (setting
limits on rate regulation and making financial failure a new prima facie
tort), consumers (especially political constituencies and corporate risk
managers), and federal officials (both making markets easier and ex-
pressing alarm about solvency). This means that decision-making fo-
rums with divergent methods and objectives will compete to make the
big decisions about insurance resource allocation (including insolvency
risk), with the outcome unclear and perhaps out of control for a long
time. Two groups stand to suffer most if we take no action now to deal
with the current situation: first, the victims of mass torts who have legal
claims against an insured person; and second, the small insurance
companies, which will be least able to keep customer confidence duringDISCUSSION 281
a substantial period of uncertainty about whether the whole insurance
market can be relied upon.
In the past three years our firm has written two reports on this
subject.1 Both consider the causes of insolvency, and the second one
gets into what we think should be done about it, specifically in the
design of guarantees. Our own view is that, in an imperfect world,
where we have inherited most of our private and governmental institu-
tional arrangements from the past but must deal with the present, the
best thing to do obviously is to change some of these perceptions about
natural or culpable insolvency and the duty of the regulator. If the duty
is to take the dangerous person off the street like a cop, not to hold him
in your arms like an emergency physician, then the duty of the regulator
is early detection and swift action to take the failing company out of the
market. That duty would include protecting innocent victims with a
limited system of guarantees.
We believe further that the first two, detection and action, can be
done well by the state regulators of insurance, and they will be doing it
better as they pursue the changes that they are embarked upon now.
About the third, liquidation and guarantees, for general liability insol-
vencies of the magnitude that generate victim suffering of the sort I was
describing--insolvencies that are large, complex, time-consuming and
certainly national--we believe they should be managed at the national
level. But whatever we do, we ought to be clear about what it is that we
are doing, and we ought to be reasonably quick about it.
1 Stewart Economics, Inc. "Managing Insurer Insolvency" (1988) and "Insurance
Insolvency Guarantees" (1990).